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THE STATES SQUARE OFF IN ARKANSAS

THE WINNER
I.

V. OKLAHOMA-AND

IS... THE EPA

INTRODUCTION

The battle between the states that made its way through the Tenth
Circuit to the United States Supreme Court began innocently enough
when the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, proposed discharging effluent
from its planned sewage plant into a local waterway that just happened
to flow into the waters of the state of Oklahoma, thirty-nine miles downstream. The Supreme Court's ruling in Arkansas v. Oklahoma I leaves
both state parties dissatisfied and confused. Arguably, Oklahoma
should be content with the Court's requirement that the Arkansas emissions comply with Oklahoma's state-set, federally-approved water quality standards. 2 But the Oklahoma appellants s contend any ruling that
upholds Fayetteville's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) 4 permit contravenes Oklahoma's efforts to protect the scenic
Illinois River. 5 Arkansas, the apparent victor with permit in hand, remains displeased and insists the decision could interfere with Arkansas'
free use of its state waterways. 6 Arkansas no longer has the degree of
control over the river necessary to allow development at Arkansas' discretion. Industrial operations on the river will necessarily be limited by
Oklahoma's water quality concerns. While the victor in this instance,
Arkansas' fear of some future application of Oklahoma's stringent water
quality standards may be warranted. Oklahoma state Senator David Bo1. 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) [hereinafter Arkansas].
2. Id. at 1057.
3. The State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma's Scenic Rivers Commission and Pollution
Control Coordinating Board, and Save the Illinois River (STIR).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988) (requires a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit for the discharge of any pollutant).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1452(b)(1) (1990). Oklahoma's antidegradation policy is set
forth in Oklahoma Water Quality Standards § 3, appended to State of Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency, 908 F.2d 595, 635 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1046
(1992). The section provides that "[n]o degradation shall be allowed in high quality waters which constitute an outstanding resource." Protected waters include designated
"Scenic Rivers". Anticipating improved water quality, the standard mandates "no degradation of such improved waters shall be allowed." See also Joint Brief-in-Chief of Petitioners/Appellants, The State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Scenic Rivers Commission and
Pollution Control Coordinating Board and STIR, State of Oklahoma v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9503, No. 89-9507, No. 899516), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) [hereinafter Tenth Circuit Joint Brief-in-Chief of Petitioner/Appellants].
6. Joint Answer Brief and Brief-in-Chief of the State of Arkansas, The Arkansas
Dept. of Pollution Control Ecology, The City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, and the Beaver
Water District, at 38-42, 45-47, State of Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency,
908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9503, No. 89-9507, No. 89-9516), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1046 (1992) [hereinafter Tenth Circuit Answer of Respondent Arkansas]; Randy Lilleston,
Arkansas, Oklahoma Argue in High Court Over River Issue, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, December 12, 1991, at IB (quoting Arkansas Attorney General, Winston Bryant, "[i]f [applying Oklahoma's water quality standards extratorritorily] were allowed, 'it would create an
economic morass' ").
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ren recently advanced Oklahoma's assault by initiating legislation to
designate the Illinois a national Scenic River. 7 If approved, the Illinois
River would be protected by the statutory prohibition on any department or agency of the United States' recommendation or authorization
of water resource projects that would have a "direct and adverse" affect
on the waterway. 8 The battle continues.
To the state parties' dissatisfaction, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) emerged triumphant, its interpretation of both the facts
and the law of the case firmly intact. While this case allowed the Court
to answer what water quality standards apply to pollution flowing interstate, more was at stake. Deciding the case required the Court to address the implicit questions about the judiciary's role in administrative
review and agency deference. Although volumes of data supported each
state's argument, the Supreme Court cast its vote in favor of neither,
choosing instead to reaffirm the potent doctrine of agency discretion. 9
The familiar ring of the Arkansas v. Oklahoma decision is not coincidental-it is the progeny ofJustice Stevens, author of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,' 0 a decision now synonymous with the notion of
agency deference. "I
This Comment analyzes Arkansas v. Oklahoma in four different parts.
Part II provides the background necessary to evaluate the decision, including its common law roots, statutory enactments, questions about
federalism and the policy of agency discretion. Part III considers the
issues decided, and the underlying Supreme Court rationale. Part IV
evaluates the economic effects provoked by the holding, and questions
the policy underpinning the decision. The Comment focuses on the effect Arkansas v. Oklahoma will have on future conflicts similar in nature,
concluding that the ruling creates a hierarchy of disincentives in the assault on environmental problems. Arkansas v. Oklahoma discourages state
attempts to attack pollution at the grass roots level, discourages critical
judicial review of agency policy and most tragically provides no incentive
to the polluter to reduce degradation.
Arkansas v. Oklahoma perpetuates the existing command and control
7. Boren Pushes Illinois River Protection Bill,

DAILY OKLAHOMAN,

July 2, 1992, at 15. If

designated a national scenic river the Illinois River would be protected under the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988), which is dedicated to the preservation
and improvement of affected waters.
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1278 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
9. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1060-61. "If the Court of Appeals had been properly respectful of the Agency's permissible reading of the Act and the Oklahoma standards, the
court would not have adjudged the Agency's decision arbitrary and capricious." Id.
10. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11. E.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 296 (1986) (Chevron not only reaffirmed the deference principle but buttressed it in
several ways: "[i]n Chevron, then, deference meant that a reviewing court not only must
consider the agency's interpretation, but must give controlling weight to that interpretation"); Thomas W. Merrill,Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992)
(provides an insightful look at the Court's disposition of agency discretion cases since
Chevron).
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regulation system, 12 a system which often fails to allocate pollution
costs' 3 to the responsible polluting parties. The command and control
system allows top-down EPA regulation through application of a plethora of individual restrictions, often promulgated with little or no economic consideration. Considerable commentary has been devoted to
pointing out economic inefficiencies continued under the command and
control system.' 4 This Comment also gives attention to the alternatives
available to revamp the system, which would result in economically
5
sound regulation and reduce costly litigation.'
II.

BACKGROUND

Arkansas v. Oklahoma is best understood when viewed in light of the
Court's historic handling of interstate pollution disputes, both before
and after enactment of a national water pollution policy. Prior to the
adoption of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
12. See Adam Babich, Understanding the New Era inEnvironmental Law, 41 S.C. L. REV.
733, 736 (1990). Babich defines the command and control system as detailed regulations
used to prescribe actions of the regulated community to dictate behavior. "Commandand-control regulation presupposes the government's ability to: (1) identify environmental
problems and set rational priorities; (2) develop regulations that provided technologically
workable and politically viable solutions; and (3) enforce those regulations effectively. Unfortunately, in the area of environmental protection none of these presuppositions has
proven true." Id.
13. Unallocated pollution costs will sometimes be referred to as externalities. See
FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAw & POLICY 29 (1990).
"[M]any environmental resources are still unpriced and remain outside the market....
[V]aluable environmental assets ... are 'used up', but their use is not accurately reflected
in the price system. Economists describe the[se] harms as . . . 'externalities', because the
burden of the resources consumed falls on society at large, not just on the user who actually consumes them." Id. (quoting FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 3-4 (1977)).
14. See generally Babich, supra note 12, at 749-62. Babich criticizes the current lack of
responsibility in cleaning up the environment and advocates use of liability-based statutes
to supplement regulatory programs, involving the private sector in improvement efforts.
Babich also lauds success of liability-based programs such as CERCLA under which imposition of strict, joint and several liability induces businesses to invest in pollution reduction. Id. See also Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1984-85) (pointing out the deficiencies in the
best available technology (BAT) approach to regulation and proposing a market based
permit system as an alternative).
15. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 14, at 1341. Ackerman and Stewart advocate a
marketable permit system. Given that an acceptable level of pollution exists, the least
costly allocation of pollution control, saving billions of dollars annually, would be to allow
polluters to buy and sell each other's permits creating powerful financial incentives for
those who can clean up most cheaply. Id. See also Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins,
Incentive-based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1991) (good discussion of commonly advocated incentive-based pollution reduction
plans, including: pollution charges based on direct taxation on emissions; marketable permits which allow the allotting of acceptable pollution in the form of permits to take advantage of each firm's differential cost of pollution control; deposit-refund systems which
implement surcharges on recyclable items to discourage illegal dumping; removal of market barriers to allow free trade, facilitating least cost abatement; and elimination of government subsidies that allow excessive resource waste); T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS
TRADING, AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985) (cites EPA's successful reform allowing for limited free trade of emission credits to more efficiently reduce
pollution).
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1972,16 federal courts 17 relied on a developing body of federal common
law to address conflicts connected with the interstate flow of pollution. ' 8
As industrial development advanced and water pollution became a national concern, the federal common law was supplanted by legislation
designed to protect national interest in navigable waterways. 1 9
A.

Common Law Actions

Disputes over superior rights to interstate waterways are not new to
our legal system. 20 As our nation became more industrialized, litigation
evolved from debate over riparian and appropriation rights to disputes
21
concerning water quality.
A trilogy of decisions handed down in the dispute between the City
of Milwaukee and the State of Illinois over sewage discharge into Lake
Michigan historically tracks the Courts' handling of interstate water pollution actions. In Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I),22 the State of Illinois
tried to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to decide a
common law nuisance action brought to enjoin Milwaukee from dumping sewage into Lake Michigan. Concluding the nuisance action fell
within the purview of specially created federal common law, the Court
explained the need for a body of federal common law in very limited
circumstances where no forum existed to settle the disputes outside of
the federal courts. 23 Bias toward protecting state interests, whether that
of the emitter or receiver state, undermined the effectiveness of actions
brought in state court. In Milwaukee I the Court explained the inherent
difficulty in deciding the proper forum for interstate pollution disputes,
outlining the unique development of the federal common law governing
interstate pollution, and the resulting struggle to create appropriate
legal remedies. 2 4 However, the Supreme Court refused to assert jurisdiction over the dispute, remanding the case to the district court for
16. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, 72 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1368 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1988)).
17. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (federal courts have jurisdiction "In all Cases ... in
which a State shall be Party"); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)&(b)(3) (1988).
18. See 1 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (MB), § 3.03(l)(a) (1992);
see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) [hereinafter Milwaukee I] (historic
development of federal common law regarding water pollution).
19. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1053; City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325-26
(1981) [hereinafter Milwaukee II]; see also Maria V. Maurasse, Comment, Oklahoma v. EPA:
Does the Clean Water Act Provide an Effective Remedy to Downstream States or Is There
Still Room Left for Federal Common Law?, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1137 (1991) (argues
federal common law is still viable in interstate pollution disputes).
20. See generally 1 GRAD, supra note 18, at §§ 3.01[l][a]-[d] (explains historic development of water rights law since the early nineteenth century).
21. Id. at 3.02[b].
22. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
23. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court relied heavily on Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236
(10th Cir. 1971), for the controlling principal that, "the ecological rights of a State in the
improper impairment of them from sources outside the State's own territory, now would
and should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis and standard in federal common
law." Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 100 (quoting Pankey, 441 F.2d at 240).
24. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 97-98.
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resolution.
Shortly after Milwaulkee I was decided Congress adopted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) amendments of 1972.26
While aware of that pending pollution control legislation, 2 7 the Court
concluded the remedies to be provided by Congress "are not necessarily
the only remedies available," 28 suggesting a concurrent role for legislative and judicial relief. After remand, the Milwaukee I action traveled
from the district court through the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
making its way to the Supreme Court in 1981 when the Court decided
Milwaukee v. Illinois [Milwaukee II].29 Influenced by the enactment of the
1972 FWPCA amendments, also known as the Clean Water Act
(CWA), s ° the Court held "establishment of a comprehensive regulatory
program supervised by an expert administrative agency" displaced the
role of federal common law in the nuisance action. s ' Consequently, the
adversely affected parties' options were limited to appeal under the statutory scheme.
Despite the verdict, consensus on the handling of interstate water
disputes remained elusive. 3 2 Justice Blackmun, writing on behalf of the
three party dissent in Milwaukee II, was not convinced that the FWPCA
solved the interstate pollution problem.3 3 Blackmun argued that federal
common law could complement the statutory scheme and should not be
34
automatically displaced.
After remand, Illinois, with limited legal alternatives, filed a state
common law nuisance action in federal district court in the state of Illinois. When the dispute reached the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
(Milwaukee III),35 the court ruled that Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II decisions precluded a state common law nuisance action, unless specifically
25. Id. at 108.
26. Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 72 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1368 (1972) (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)); see also Milwaukee I,451 U.S. 304, 310 (1981) (FWPCA
was adopted five months after the Milwaukee I decision).
27. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107 ("It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance.").
28. Id. at 103.
29. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
30. Id. at 317-18 (the Court explicitly points to the legislative history of the amendments showing Congressional intent, emphasizing that "[n]o Congressman's remarks on
the legislation were complete without ... reference to the 'comprehensive' nature of the
Amendments.").
31. Id. at 317.
32. See, e.g., id.at 332-54 (Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
33. Id. at 333 (Blackmun, Marshall & Stevens,JJ., dissenting) ("Because I believe that
Congress intended no such extinction [of federal common law remedies], and surely did
not contemplate the result reached by the Court today, I respectfully dissent.").
34. Id. at 334 (An" 'automatic displacement' [of federal common law] is inadequate in
two respects. It fails to reflect the unique role federal common law plays between one
State and the citizens or government of another... [and] it ignores this Court's frequent
recognition that federal common law may complement congressional action."); see also
Maurrasse, supra note 19, at 1179-87.
35. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1196 (1985) [hereinafter Milwaukee III].
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provided for by the FWPCA.3 6 The Milwaukee controversy ended without consideration of the merits following years of litigation and two
Supreme Court decisions.
The controversy over the availability of state common law nuisance
actions under the CWA, which the amended FWPCA, was addressed by
the Supreme Court in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette.3 7 A group of
Vermont property owners filed a common law nuisance action in Vermont District Court, seeking damages and injunctive relief from International Paper Company's (IPC) practice of dumping paper by-products
into Lake Champlain.3 8 Dumping occurred in New York, but the pollution migrated to the Vermont lake. In 1987, the Court concluded the
CWA did not preclude state common law actions, provided that the action is brought under the laws of the emitter state.3 9 The decision did
little to relieve the downstream states' dilemma, as a source's emissions
presumably comply with the emitter state's regulations. The Court went
on in Ouellette to describe the role of the downstream state as
subordinate, a rationale heavily relied upon by Arkansas in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma.40

The Ouellette Court's unanimous ruling that state common law actions were available did not mean the Court agreed on which state's law
to apply. 4 1 A sharp split of opinion appeared inJustice Brennan's partial dissent which argued parties should be allowed to bring a state nuisance action in either the emitter or downstream state, using existing
42
conflict of law rules to determine which state's law should apply.
These decisions expose the Court's difficulty in fashioning equitable relief in interstate pollution disputes and in determining the proper
forum for such disputes. The lack of unanimity about the effect of the
CWA on interstate pollution conflicts indicates why no clearly distilled
precedent existed prior to Arkansas v. Oklahoma.
36. Id. at 411. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the action concluding the
FWCPA does not contemplate application of the law of the state receiving the waste, in
this case, Illinois. Id. at 414.
37. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
38. Id. at 484.
39. Id. at 498-99. The Court explained the two sections of the CWA comprising the
savings clause" which preserve the right of an individual to bring an action thereunder,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e) & 1370 (1988), "pre-empts state law to the extent that the state law
is applied to an out-of-state point source." Ouellette, 497 U.S. at 500.
40. Id. at 494-99; see also Tenth Circuit Answer of Respondent Arkansas, supra note 6,
at 35, 40-43, 45, 46.
41. Ouellette, 497 U.S. at 504-07. Ouellette was a 5-3 opinion with Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part: "I find that the Act's plain language clearly indicates that Congress wanted to leave intact the traditional right of the
affected State to apply its own tort law when its residents are injured by an out-of-state
polluter." Id. See also Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 197 (1985) (preemption of state common law remedies is
inconsistent with congressional intent). Contra, Chicago Park Dist. v. Sanitary Dist. of
Hammond, 530 F.Supp. 291 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1981) (state law claims against out-of-state
dischargers are pre-empted).
42. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 501-02 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("The Act provides no support for deviation from well-settled conflict-of-law principals.").
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The Clean Water Act

A two-year study conducted by the United States Senate Committee
on Public Works, concluded in 1972, revealed dismal progress in the
nation's efforts to abate water pollution. 43 Following the study, Congress adopted the FWPCA amendments of 1972 with "the objective...
to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters". 44 Resolve to abate pollution was apparent in
both the Committee report and resulting legislation 45 which states, "the
Committee believes it is important to clarify this point: No one has the
right to pollute."'4 6 Congress amended the Act in 1977 and retitled it
the Clean Water Act (CWA). 4 7 The touchstone of the 1972 amendments is the creation of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
48
System (NPDES) permitting scheme.
The NPDES permitting program makes the discharge of effluent
into navigable waterways illegal in the absence of an approved permit. 49
Power to issue NPDES permits either rests with states that have enacted
a federally approved permitting program, or with the EPA, in the absence of an EPA-approved state program. 50 Success in eliminating pollution is then measured by the ambient water quality in areas affected by
the permitted discharge. 5 1 The CWA provides for concurrent federal
and state authority over waterways, expressly preserving states' rights to
"adopt or enforce" standards or limitations on pollution discharge. 52
Adoption of water quality standards remains in the hands of individual
state governments, acknowledging state sovereignty and each state's intimate knowledge of its own natural resources. 5 3 The CWA respects
state soveriegnty by allowing each state to adopt water quality standards
more stringent than the minimums required by the EPA. 5 4 The EPA
Administrator retains authority to block state issued permits that fail to
consider the effect permitted discharge may have on a downstream
55
state.
43. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972), repnnted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3674.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
45. Id.

46. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3709.
47. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. 11 1990).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
49. Id. § 3709; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
51. Id. § 1313 (1988); see also S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3675.
52. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3675 ("Talents and capacities of those States
whose own programs are superior are to be called upon to administer the permit system
within their boundaries."); see also District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 860
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (where state permits are concerned, the managers will "look for and expect State and local interest, initiative, and personnel to provide a much more effective
program than that which would result from control in regional offices of the [EPA].").
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
54. Id. ("such state ... may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other
limitation . . .which is less stringent" than the federally approved standards); see also
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) (state limitations
supercede less stringent federal limitations adopted pursuant to FWCPA).
55. Id. § 1342(b)(3) & (d)(2).
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States affected by a proposed NPDES permit are admonished to
voice their objections prior to permit issuance. 56 Statutorily required
hearings provide the forum for dissent. 57 After a permit hearing,
"[s]uch agency, based upon the recommendation of such State, the Administrator, and upon any additional evidence ... shall condition such
license or permit in such manner as may be necessary to insure compli58
ance with applicable water quality requirements."1
After hearings in Arkansas regarding the Fayetteville plant application, the EPA concluded that an integrated reading of several CWA provisions prescribed that effluent discharged under an NPDES permit
must conform with the downstream state's water quality standards. 59
Both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Ciruit adopted this
interpretation. 60
C.

Federalism andfederal-state tension under the CWA

The CWA mandates a partnership between the federal and state
government. 6 ' Compelling language indicates the importance of the
states' role:
It is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation and enhancement) of land
and water resources and to consult with the Administrator in
62
the exercise of his authority under this chapter.
Since the CWA operates without reference to state boundaries, a
pollution problem affecting two states invokes notions of federalism and
state sovereignty. The CWA does not clearly resolve the tension between federal legislation as the "supreme Law of the Land" 63 and state
autonomy to protect its waterways for the health and safety of its
constituants. 64
Vesting the states with a major role in deciding water resource allo56. Id. § 1341(a)(2).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. §§ 1341, 1342, 1362; see also Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 908 F.2d 595, 609-15 (10th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Oklahoma] (Tenth Circuit held
the EPA reading of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314, 1341, 1342, 1365 & 1370 to require compliance with affected downstream states' federally approved water quality standards was
reasonable).
60. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056; Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 604.
61. SEN. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3675 ("The [19721 legislation will restore
Federal-State balance to the permit system.").
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988).
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. Detailed consideration of constitutional law issues implicit in the Arkansas ruling
are beyond the scope of this comment. Brief consideration of congressional delegation is
addressed in text accompanying notes 61-74, supra. For a more detailed discussion see
Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 335-43 (1987), calling
for reconstitutive strategies of regulation to counteract addiction "to federal rules and
orders that attempt to minutely prescribe conduct throughout our complexly differentiated society".
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565

cation is a natural offshoot of the nation's historic water law development. 6 5 State control of water allocation and use was a basic tenant of
frontier expansionism. 6 6 When the CWA was enacted to coordinate pollution abatement efforts, however, Congress encroached on the longstanding policy of state self-determination in water allocation and
protection. Intervention into this province by the federal government
should arguably occur only because there exists an overrriding federal
concern to protect navigable waterways.67
The federal government's intrusion into this realm evokes little uproar when disputes are strictly intrastate. 68 The CWA merely ensures
that each state observe minimally acceptable federal pollution standards.6 9 When the dispute crosses state lines, however, the federal government's role becomes more pronounced. The inherent federal-state
conflicts are exacerbated when the relative interests of two or more
70
states must be considered in the decision making process.
An unusual application of federalism arises when state statutes are
promulgated pursuant to an overarching federal regulation. 7' State-enacted, federally-approved water quality standards take on a federal essence, 72 as each state's standards are not preempted, but rather adopted
by the federal government. 73 The question then remains whether adoption by the EPA evokes simultaneous disregard for the underlying state
concern prompting implementation of the original standards. The Arkansas v. Oklahoma decision suggests such a position. 74 The response
this position elicits from each state is evident. Part IV of this Comment
65. See D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses; The
History of Conflict, the Prospectsfor Accomodation, 21 ENv-rL. L. 1 (1991); GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr.
& Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality Law, 60 U. CoLo. L. REV. 841,
857 (1989) ([I]n the mid-nineteenth century as the West was being settled ...the United
States Congress, through a series of statutes, severed the waters of the United States from
the public lands" and deferred to the states' for allocation of water and the creation and
administration of water rights.)
66. See Bell & Johnson, supra note 65.
67. See Hobbs & Raley, supra note 65, at 845-55 (1977 Clean Water Act is an exercise
in fundamental federalism); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism and
Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 607 (1985)
(Congressional power limiting state authority often taken at expense of the state).
68. Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir.
1980). In Mississippi Comm 'n on Natural Resources, one of the few cases on disputed intrastate
standards, the State of Mississippi lost its challenge against the EPA mandate that Mississippi comply with stricter federal water quality standards. Id.
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
70. See, e.g., Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992); Pierce, supra note 67, at 646-61 (model
for deciding federalism disputes).
71. See, e.g., Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1059.
72. Id. ("at least insofar as they affect the issuance of a permit in another state, the
Oklahoma standards have a federal character").
73. See generally id.; see also S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3672. "The States have
first responsibility for enforcement of their standards. When approved by the [EPA], however, the standards for interstate navigable waters become Federal-State standards." Id.
. 74. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1059 ("[Tjhe Oklahoma standards have a federal character,
the EPA's reasonable, consistently held interpretation of those standards is entitled to substantial deference.").
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addresses the effect this evident tension may have on future state pollution abatement efforts.
D.

Agency Deference

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 5 governs the review of
agency rulings on appeal. Absent procedural defect, or clear frustration
of legislative intent, courts are called on to uphold agency decisions not
76
arbitrary or capricious or otherwise in violation of the law.
Despite criticism by commentators, 7 7 the scope of agency deference
has expanded through a series of decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court, 7 8 most notably, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.79 Justice Stevens, for the majority,8 0 explained in Chevron the
limited judicial role in review of agency action.8 1 The Court enunciated
a two-step analysis to review agency decisions. Initially, the Court
looked at whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. ' 8 2 If congressional intent is clear, a court merely compares the
agency ruling against the clear intent of the statute, giving "effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."18 3 Even if congressional
intent is difficult to discern, agencies have the latitude to fill legislative
gaps.8 4 Secondly, if the statute is succeptable to different interpretations because the statute itself is "silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue", 8 5 a court must respect and abide by the agency's reasonable interpretion. 8 6 Deference to the agency interpretation ensures
a court will not substitute its judgment for that of an agency empowered
75. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
76. Id. § 706(2)(a). Under § 706(2) of the APA, agency decisions can be set aside on
limited grounds if the decision is (a) arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, (b)
contrary to constitutional right, power or privilege, (c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority or limitations, (d) without observance of procedure required by law, (e) unsupported by substantial evidence, or (f) unwarranted by the facts. Id.
77. See generally Russell L. Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 109 (1991) (explaining different strategies in attacking agency decisions, with admitted
limited success); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990) (explaining agencies' threshold defense of unreviewability);
Rodney A. Smolla, The Erosion of the Principle that the Government Must Follow Self-Imposed
Rules, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 472 (1984) (attacking permissiveness in agency deviation from
self-imposed rules).
78. E.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
79. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
80. Rehnquist, O'Connor and Marshall, JJ., took no part in the decision.
81. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("[T]he Administrator's interpretation ... is entitled to
deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting
policies.").
82. Id. at 842.
83. Id. at 843.
84. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). Although Morton is long cited for its
"gap-filling" proposition, the Morton Court rejected the BIA interpretation of the gap to
be filled.
85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
86. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defence Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125
(1985); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-46.
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with administering national policy. 8 7 Underlying this premise is the notion the agency is democratically accountable for its decisions, while
88
courts possess no constituency.
From this vantgage, it is no surprise Justice Stevens took the opportunity in Arkansas v. Oklahoma to reinforce the Chevron doctrine of agency
deference. 89 In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, Justice Stevens quickly pointed out
that the Tenth Circuit broke with precedent, severing the judicial limb
90
on which the Tenth Circuit was seated.
III.

A.

ARKANSAS

V. OKLAHOMA

Facts

InJuly, 1985, the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, proposed discharging effluent from a planned sewage treatment plant into Mud Creek, a
tributary of the Illinois River. 9 1 The Illinois flows, in turn, into the state
of Oklahoma approximately thirty-nine miles downstream from the Fayetteville plant. 9 2 Prior to commencing operations, Fayetteville applied
for an NPDES permit in accordance with the rules and regulations set
forth in the CWA for EPA-administered permits. 9 3 Approval of the permit would have allowed approximately one-half of the plant's total 12.2
million gallons of estimated discharge to flow into Oklahoma on a daily
basis.

94

On August 8, 1985, the EPA conducted the first of several permit
hearings. 9 5 Oklahoma objected to the permit, concerned about the effect the effluent may have on the Illinois River. 96 Already designated a
state scenic river, the Illinois River was afforded extensive protection
under Oklahoma's state Scenic Rivers Act. 9 7 Over Oklahoma's protests,
the permit was signed and issued by the EPA on November 5, 1985,
drawing the battle lines that would capture national attention.9 8
87. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11; see also EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n,
449 U.S. 64 (1980); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
88. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (whereas judges are not part of either elected political
branch, administrative agencies are democratically accountable because they operate
under the direction of the executive branch); see Starr, supra note 11, at 301-04 (insight into
the policies underlying Chevron).
89. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1060. ("[Tjhe court failed to give due regard to the EPA's
interpretation of its own regulations.").
90. Id. at 1058 ("[Tlhe Court of Appeals exceeded the legitimate scope of judicial
review of an agency adjudication.").
91. See id., 112 S. Ct. at 1051.
92. See id.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
94. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051.
95. See Tenth Circuit Joint Brief-in-Chief of Petitioner/Appellants, supra note 5, at 1.
96. Id. at 30-44. Oklahoma argued, inter alia: (1) the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
misinterpreted its beneficial use limitation, id. at 30 "Proposition VI"; (2) the permit was
issued in violation of its antidegradation policy, id. at 34 "Proposition VII"; (3) the ALJ
misapplied its nutrient standard requirements, id. at 39 "Proposition VIII"; and (4) the
ALJ failed to consider additional evidence of the design inadequacy of the Fayetteville
plant, id. at 42 "Proposition IX".
97. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
98. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990). See also Tim Smart, The Next War
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ProceduralHistory

Objections to the EPA's handling of this dispute are evident in the
volumes of appeals attacking the decision on both procedural and substantive grounds. 9 9 After initial permit approval by the EPA, Oklahoma
petitioned the agency for an evidentiary hearing, contending that the
permit was granted without consideration of several important issues. 10 0
The EPA Regional Administrator allowed partial review, limited to
whether Fayetteville's discharge would violate Oklahoma's water quality
standards and whether Fayetteville had the ability to adequately treat the
sewage before it reached the Arkansas-Oklahoma state line.' 0 '
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on August 18, 1987, nearly
two years after the initial permit hearing. 10 2 Affirming the permit, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)decided discharge from the Arkansas
10 3
plant would not have an "undue impact" on the Illinois River.
Oklahoma appealed. On review, the EPA's Chief Judicial Officer (CJO)
found the "undue impact" standard inadequate. The CJO first ruled
that the CWA "requires the NPDES to impose any effluent limitations
10 4
necessary to comply with applicable state water quality standards."'
The permit was then remanded to decide whether the discharge would
have a "detectable impact" on the river. 10 5 After completing detailed
findings of the facts, the ALJ upheld issuance of the permit, concluding
application of the revised standard showed no detectable violation of
Oklahoma's water quality. 10 6 The Chief Judicial Officer sustained the
issuance of the permit. 10 7 Oklahoma's next appeal, consolidated with
appeals from the Arkansas parties, brought the matter before the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 10 8
On July 10, 1990, almost five years after the initial permit application, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ALJ's decision that Oklahoma's
Between the States Could Be Over Clean Water, Bus. WK., Dec. 1.6, 1991; at 32; Chris Casteel,
High Court to Study River Fight, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 8, 1991, p. 1 at col. 1, p. 2A at col.
3.
99. See generally Tenth Circuit joint Brief-in-Chief of Petitioner/Appellants, supra note
5, at 1-12 (complete historic detail and dates for all appeals and administrative rulings).
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 3. The Administrator denied review of whether (1) the EPA erred in failing
to require an Environment Impact Statement prior to issuance of the permit; (2) the EPA
violated the CWA by denying Oklahoma adequate time to determine whether Fayetteville's
proposed discharge was in violation of Oklahoma's water quality statutes; (3) the permit
should be modified to prohibit the split-flow component which allows discharge into Mud
Creek; and (4) the permit safe-guards were sufficient to protect the Illinois River. Id.
102. Id.at 5.
103. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051. The ALJ originally decided that more than a mere de
minimus impact on the State of Oklahoma's water is needed before revoking the permit.
104. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051-52; see also Tenth Circuit Joint Brief-in-Chief of Petitioner/Appellants, supra note 5, at 10.
105. Id. at 1052. The CJO instructed the ALJ that "the permit shoud be upheld if the
record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the authorized discharges would
not cause an actual detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards." Id. (empha-

sis in original).
106. Id.
107. Tenth Circuit Answer of Respondent Arkansas, supra note 6, at 11.
108. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1991).

1993]

ARKANSAS v. OKLAHOMA

569

water quality standards were applicable.' 0 9 Judge Brorby, writing for
the court, found the EPA's decision to grant the permit "arbitrary and
capricious"" 10 due to the EPA's failure to consider "an important aspect
of the problem [or] offer an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency."'I The Tenth Circuit believed the effect of additional discharge into the already degraded river
2
warrented the court's reversal of the decision to issue the permit. "1 Violation of the CWA, the court argued, is inescapable when additional
effluent is allowed to enter an already degraded body of water.' 1 3 In
view of the Supreme Court's previously articulated policy of agency deference, the Tenth Circuit ruling received much attention." 14 Both parties appealed the circuit court's decision and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of the "importance and novelty of the Court of Appeals' decision."' 15
C.

Issues

To reach a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court applied the
CWA to three issues: 1) whether the EPA is obligated to apply downstream states' water quality standards on upstream emitters as a condition of issuing a NPDES permit; 2) notwithstanding a statutory
obligation to apply downstream water quality standards, whether the
EPA has authority to mandate source state compliance with downstream
water quality statutes; and, 3) whether the Tenth Circuit correctly interpretated the CWA to preclude further discharge into an already degraded body of water. 11 6 Resolution of the first two issues addressed
the scope of the EPA's discretionary powers. To resolve the third issue
the Court evaluated the Tenth Circuit's judicial authority to overrule the
EPA by denying the permit.
D.

Holding

Summarily dismissing the first question of whether the EPA is obligated to apply downstream state water quality standards on an upstream
109. Id. at 615.
110. Id. at 616. "[Wie conclude EPA's decision to issue the Fayetteville permit was
arbitrary and capricious. The agency's decision is also flawed by misinterpretation and
misapplication of two important Oklahoma water quality regulations and by arbitrary disregard for certain expert testimony." Id.
111. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 43
(1983).)
112. Id. at 634. The Tenth Circuit held, "[plarticularly in light of the existing pollution
of the Illinois scenic river, the agency's decision is inconsistent with the language of the
Clean Water Act, as interpreted in light of the legislative history, and frustrates the policy
that Congress sought to implement." Id.
113. Id.
114. See generally Steven J. Bushong, Note, Upstream Pollution and Downstream Problems:
Oklahoma v. EPA Makes a Splash in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 233
(1992); John Treangen, Note, Cleaning up the Clean Water Act: Oklahoma v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 36 S.D. L. REV. 739 (1991).
115. Arkansas, 112 S.Ct. at 1052.
116. Id. at 1056.
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emitter, the Court upheld the EPA's reasonable and permissible statutory interpretation of the CWA to apply Oklahoma's water quality standards."17 At the same time, the Court concluded the state parties'
reliance on precedent established in Ouellette and similar cases to determine the respective state roles in establishing water quality standards
misplaced. The Court distinguished state-administered, federally-approved permits from Fayetteville's permit granted in accordance with
the EPA procedures, refusing to rely on previous decisions clarifying
obligations under state initiated programs. 1 8 The Court declined the
opportunity to clarify future obligations under the statute, allowing the
EPA full discretion in statutory interpretation." 19
Analysis of the second issue-the EPA's authority to interpret and
apply the Oklahoma standards absent any statutory guidance-merited
more detailed discussion. Reiterating the CWA's broad purpose, the
Court focused on a statutory clause which vests with the EPA Administrator power to make "such other requirements as he deems proper." 120
Finding nothing in the history of the CWA to limit the Administrator's
authority, the Court concluded that the decision to require the Arkansas
plant's emmission to comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards
within the Administrator's domain.121
Arkansas's argument that the Court had previously defined the
downstream state's role as subordinate was dismissed by a narrow reading of Ouellette. 122 The Court explained that Ouellette concerned permitting procedures only, and did not "in any way constrain the EPA's
authority to require a point source to comply with downstream water
23
quality standards."'
The third issue-the Tenth Circuit's denial of the permit on the basis that the discharge would further damage an already "degraded"
river-was also decided with an eye toward broad agency authority. The
that the
Supreme Court disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion 124
EPA decision to issue the permit was arbitrary and capricious.
Resolving the first two issues in favor of EPA discretion required
only a short step to reversal of the Tenth Circuit's contradictory reading
of the CWA. 12 5 To support this position, the Court adopted the EPA's
argument that refusal of a permit because the discharge has some "theoretical impact" on a downstream state's water quality places effective
117. Id.
118. Id.
seems unwise to evaluate those arguments in a case such
119. Id.The Court held, "[i]t
as this one, which only involves a federal permit." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1057. The Court held, "we find nothing in that [Act's] history to indicate
that Congress intended to preclude the EPA from establishing a general requirement that
such permits be conditioned to ensure compliance with downstream water quality standards." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.at 1057 (emphasis added).
124. Id.at 1061.
125. Id.at 1059.
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veto power of upstream development in the hands of the downstream
state. 126 The Court disregarded the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that a
downstream state's influence over upstream discharge is necessarily lim12 7
ited by the finite ability to measure actual effects.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Issues
1.

EPA Obligations Under the CWA.

The distinction between an agency's authority to interpret a statute
and its obligation to apply the interpretation is subtle. The Court
granted the EPA authority to impose certain water quality standards,
free from any obligation to act in a consistant manner in the future. Distinguishing the required standards from the authority to apply the standards masks the ultimate result. Allowing the EPA latitude to decide its
own obligations has no real effect since making the requirement tractable at the EPA's volition creates no standard. This tautological approach provides no guidance or clarification for future disputes
concerning the interstate flow of pollution. Although the applicable
standard is determined by the downstream state, the EPA's authority to
decide compliance overrides downstream state influence.
If predictable application of the two-pronged Chevron test is of major importance to the Court, then allowing the EPA to decide its own
obligations is understandable. 128 Arkansas v. Oklahoma maintains deference as the default standard. When ease of judicial review is our only
concern, the issue of the EPA's future obligations is of small consequence. The problem remains, however, because the parties went to
court to define those future rights and obligations.
Without an effective check on deference, agencies lack accountability. Even though an agency's consistent interpretation of its own rules
lends credibility to withstand future attacks on the agency's exercise of
discretion,' 29 agencies are not bound by past regulatory interpretation.' 3 0 Because the Arkansas decision imposes no obligation on the
EPA to apply any state water quality standards in the future, the problem remains unresolved after six years of litigation and the paradoxical
expenditure of millions of dollars, ostensibly to save resources.
The Court's refusal to consider past obligations under state-implemented permitting schemes is inconsistent with the Court's later conclu126. Id.
127. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 606-07.
128. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984); see supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
129. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S.
27, 37 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (consistent
and contemporaneous construction of a statute increases the amount of deference given to
agency interpretation).
130. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 ("initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in
stone"); see also Ruth Colker, Administrative ProsecutorialIndiscretion, 63 TUL. L. REv. 877
(1989).
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sion that state-enacted water quality standards become federal in
nature,13 ' and thus, subject to full EPA discretion. The confusion could
have been avoided if the Courts' analyis of permit obligations mirrored
its consideration of the nature of state water quality standards. The
state permitting programs previously evaluated by the Court in cases
cited as precedent by both parties should have been considered federal
in nature and also subject to similar federal interpretation.
2.

EPA Authority under the CWA.

When considering the second issue-EPA authority to interpret
state standards-the Court disregarded its previous discussion in Arkansas v. Oklahoma of the federal-state relationship under the CWA.13 2 The
CWA encourages each state to set its own water quality standards, even
allowing more stringent state standards than those required by the
EPA. 133 In Arkansas, the Court ignored federal-state partnership by
overriding Oklahoma's previous interpretation of its state-set, federallyapproved water quality standards. Favoring the EPA's interpretation of
the Oklahoma statutes over the express intent of the enacting state legislators makes states appear more pawns than policy-makers.
Interestingly, the EPA Administrator's authority to make these decisions is not based on clear legislative intent, but rather on the CWA's
failure to expressly limit the Administrator's authority. 134 Apparently,
silence in congressional enactment vests unlimited authority in the Administrator without accountability: such broad arbitrary power dilutes
any force ofjudicial review under the APA's "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. While this conclusion is admittedly overreaching, if the EPA is
charged with filling legislative gaps with any reasonable interpretation, it
is difficult to imagine circumstances under which additional efforts
would be taken to challenge EPA decisions.
3.

Tenth Circuit's Denial of the EPA Permit.

By overturning the Tenth Circuit's permit denial, the Court narrowed the already limited scope of agency review. 13 5 Considering only
a portion of the Tenth Circuit's analysis-namely the circuit court's concern over the already degraded quality of the river-the Supreme Court
36
ignored the balance of the evidence relied upon by the circuit court.1
Troubled by the circuit court's disregard for the "substantial evidence"
131. See Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1059 ("state water quality standards-promulgated by
the States with substantial guidance from the EPA [citation omitted] approved by the
Agency-are part of the federal law of water pollution control").
132. See id. at 1054.
133. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
134. See Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056. For example, the Court held, "[elven if the Clean
Water Act itself does not require the Fayetteville discharge to comply with Oklahoma's
water quality standards, the statute clearly does not limit the EPA's authority to mandate
such compliance." Id.
135. See id. at 1060.
136. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 616-18. The court carefully reviewed the purposes behind
Oklahoma's Beneficial Use Limitation/Antidegradation policies and determined that al-
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standard, the Court pointed out that the circuit opinion mentions, on
several occasions, that sufficient evidence was before the EPA to draw
the circuit's conclusions.' 3 7 This rationale confuses the availability of
evidence with its nature. An abundance of evidence does not necessarily
mean all evidence supports the agency position. Again ignoring the circuit court,' 3 8 the Supreme Court overlooked the contradiction between
the underlying evidence and the EPA findings.
Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court recognized judicial
review under the APA includes striking down agency acts that entirely
fail to consider an important aspect of a problem.' 3 9 Oklahoma's water
quality statutes, now part of federal law, should have received consistant
interpretation based on the enacting legislature's intent and the purposes of the CWA. Considering the remedial nature of the CWA, 140 dismissal of the Tenth Circuit's well reasoned approach to this analysis did
not merit the complete foreclosure it received.
B.

Economic Effects of the Decision

The Court's willingness to perpetuate an already economically inefficient system of agency-administered public policy is not the appropriate solution to our administrative or environmental woes. Justice
Stevens' extension of agency deference, initially advocated in Chevron,
produced no significant procedural change in current methods of judicial review. The unfortunate effect results from application of the procedure. Granting the EPA discretionary authority to interpret and apply
Oklahoma's water quality standards creates a series of disincentives that
block the road to environmental improvement. First, the role of each
state in implementing environmental policy is severely undermined.
Second, expansion of EPA discretion does not create administrative in4
centives to reform programs many deem outdated and ineffective.' '
Third, the purpose and effect ofjudicial review as a check on administrative agency performance and procedure is rendered impotent. Fourth,
and perhaps most importantly, pollution emitters are not encouraged to
expand their efforts to abate pollution. These deleterious results, as dislowing additional pollutants into the river would directly contravene the underlying policies. Id.
137. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1060. "[A]t least four times, the court concluded that 'there
was substantial evidence before the ALJ to support' particular findings which the court
thought appropriate, but which were contrary to those initially made by the ALJ." Id.
138. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 619-31. "[The] EPA undermined our usual deference to its
special expertise by the failure of its presiding officer to consider an important scientific
principal, the oxygen-reducing effects of algae respiration and decay, and by his incomplete understanding of phosphorus assimilation . . . [and] lack of thoroughness." Id. at
630.
139. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1060; Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 599.
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) ("the objective of this Chapter is to restore integrity of the
Nation's waters" (emphasis added)); see also S. REP. No. 414,supra note 43, at 3710 ("[T]he
Administrator is under specific obligation to require that [high quality] level of effluent
control .. .without regard to the limits of practicability.").
141. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text and infra notes 148 & 150 and accompanying text.
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cussed below, are closely tied to perpetuating the system currently in
place and are especially disturbing considering Congress' emphatic call
to reduce pollution when the CWA was enacted.142
1.

State Effects.

Allowing the EPA latitude to interpret and apply state law over the
dissent of the affected state-even though the state law was promulgated
pursuant to a federal program--challenges the longstanding policy vesting states with control over state resources.14 3 Arkansas' argument that
application of the Oklahoma standards violates its right to use its waterways is unpersuasive, 14 4 running contrary to the belief that a party's
freedom to utilize resources remains unencumbered until the use harms
another party. Congressional understanding that downstream states'
concerns provide limits on upstream activities is reflected in the NPDES
45
permitting scheme that requires extensive downstream state input.'
State control over water resources, including state water quality
standards, more accurately reflects the desires of those with a vested
interest in the state's water quality maintenance.1 46 All of the options
allowed to states under the CWA, from establishing strict water quality
standards to enacting a seperate permitting procedure, require expenditure of state funds. The EPA's disregard, with court approval, of state
water quality standards results in an uncertainty of whether the effort to
establish state standards as required by the CWA14 7 is efficient or costeffective.
2.

Agency Effects.

The Court's unconditional affirmation of the EPA's interpretation
of the CWA provides no incentive for the EPA to conduct critical, pointspecific analyses of water quality questions, especially those unique to a
geographic area. If EPA standards will be upheld on a limited evidentiary basis, no need to expend time and energy in more intensive study
exists. This is perplexing because the Court, by ignoring state statutory
interpretation, effectively renders state studies of this nature moot.
Without accountability, agencies may be less motivated to consider all
viable alternatives in developing abatement programs, including those
proposed by individual states. Criticism of this aspect of EPA centralization has already been leveled.14 8 The lack of motivation may occur at
precisely the same time that increasing industrial complexity requires a
heightened need for specialized study.
142. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3675.
143. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
144.

Tenth Circuit Answer of Respondent Arkansas, supra note 6, at 43.

145. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988).
146. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988).
148. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 14, at 1333. "The present regulatory system
wastes tens of billions of dollars every year, misdirects resources, stifles innovation, and
spawns massive and often counterproductive litigation." Id.
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3. Judicial Effects.
The ruling in Arkansas sounds a clear warning to discourage considered judicial review of agency decisions. It constricts courts' efforts to
ensure the foremost concern of the EPA is public policy implementation. 14 9 After the Supreme Court's correction of the Tenth Circuit,
courts may be even more reluctant to consider agency decisions. This
exacerbates what has already been labeled by some as the "rubberstamp" effect of agency decision making.15 0 Lack of judicial review allows agencies to operate without accountability. Without accountability
there is no assurance that programs implemented by the agency properly reflect the public needs prompting the underlying legislation. Public awareness of the implications of judicial inability to confront agency
decisions, and the futility of agency challenges, may result in legitimate
industrial or environmental concerns going unaddressed.
An unintended effect of Arkansas may be to promote the use of nonjudicial alternatives to resolve interstate pollution conflicts.' 5 ' The
state parties involved in Arkansas have begun a dialog regarding interstate resource planning.' 5 2 If litigation does not achieve the intended
result of establishing absolute rights to the river, alternatives must be
considered. Resource savings may result from earlier resolution without
litigation.
4.

Industry Effects.

Perhaps the most serious implication of Arkansas v. Oklahoma is its
failure to provide incentives for polluters to stop polluting. Affirming
149. Arkansas, 112 S.Ct. at 1061. "It is not our role, or that of the Court of Appeals, to
decide which policy choice is the better one for it is clear that Congress has entrusted such
decisions to the Environmental Protection Agency." Id.
150. Smolla, supra note 75, at 475 (provides a due process attack on permissive agency
deviation from self-imposed procedural rules); Jonathon R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local
Regulations and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990) (calling for closer judicial review); see also Abner J. Mivka,
How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1986). In an April
17, 1986, address at American University Law Review banquet, the Honorable AbnerJ.
Mikva of the federal District Court of the District of Columbia decried the effect of Chevron
of limiting judicial statutory interpretation: "[c]ases like Chevron, however, deny parties,
and more generally, the system of democratic government, access to judges' rich experience in answering these [statutory interpretation) questions." Id. at 8.
151. Although litigation has long been the chosen method to establish rights and
boundaries to waters, many argue the courts are not best suited to resolve environmental
conflicts. While decisions about the ownership of specific rights to water can easily be
structured into a one-time settlement, problems resulting from the continuous flow of
interstate waters frequently require ongoing attention. The courts' ability to address only
specifically disputed facts results in many of the complexities of the problem to go unresolved. See LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984); Frank P. Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 157 (1989) (discusses environmental disputes amenable to alternative forms of
resolution); Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Rolefor the Courts?,
10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1985).
152. Paul English, Arkansas, Oklahoma Target Water Quality, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 3,
1992, at 7 (A joint task force created by both state's governors, implemented to "work
toward an effective means of controlling the natural and man-made pollution that is
threatening the streams and lakes of this region.").
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the EPA's position merely continues our current system of command
and control pollution abatement.' 5 3 The mentality that spurred the
EPA to "push, prod, and cajole"' 15 4 industry into reducing pollution
must evolve to meet the needs of the twentieth century. Industrial complexity continues to increase and the ability of a centralized agency to
efficiently administer and economically monitor a growing scheme of
top-down regulations is no longer viable. This does not mean a wholesale abandonment of regulations is in order. However, it is time for the
55
EPA to shift its role from a pure regulator to a market facilitator.'
Some may argue that the Court's consideration of the degraded
condition of the Illinois River prior to denying the Fayetteville permit
places a disproportionate share of the clean-up costs on new industries.
While true in theory, this proposition begs the question of where to
draw the "bright-line" prohibiting new polluters from entering the market. The possibility of discrimination against new polluters is no excuse
to allow additional pollution and disregard the remedial goals of the
CWA.
The Tenth Circuit addressed this notion in Oklahoma v. Arkansas by
pointing out the Illinois River has already been degraded by upstream
polluters. 156 The court considered the poor condition of the river as
evidence that the practice of allowing new contamination, similar to that
of the Fayetteville plant, must stop. Current degradation implies industrial users have previously polluted the river without bearing the appropriate cost. The degradation continues today. Unfortunately, the circuit
court was not in the position to take the analysis one step further and
query the allocation of pollution costs between existing and future polluters. Economic considerations suggest that only those polluters utilizing least cost methods to clean up should be encouraged to operate on
the river. Merely requiring compliance with existing command and control regulations does not compel the overhaul of outmoded pollution
control systems. While forcing use of newer, more efficient methods of
153. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
154. Daniel A. Mazmanian & David L. Morell, EPA: Coping With the New PoliticalEconomic
Order, 21 ENVrL. L. 1477, 1478.
155. Id.

Masmanian & Morrell outline ten strategies for the EPA's advancement into

the coming decades: (1) EPA must break out of its monomedia myopia, adopting instead a
true cross-media focus; (2) environmental management must shift from centralized regulatory control to reliance on market-based solutions; (3) EPA, whenever feasible, must rely
on goal-based performance standards as opposed to rules and regulations demanding specific actions; (4) environmental management issues must be understood as collective
goods problems requiring collective solutions both geographically and over time; (5) decentralized arenas of action (states, localities, individual firms) are preferable; (6) environmental decisions must be sensitive to business and economic requirements (cost, ease of
compliance) that define their actual implementation; (7) environmental decisions must be
sensitive to social, ethic and minority concerns; (8) emphasis must be placed on source
reduction, pollution prevention, recycling and material efficiency; (9) credible and enduring citizen involvement is required in both policy formulation and implementation; (10)
command-and-control management strategies are often incompatible with several of the
above principles, and should be adopted only as a last resort. Id.
156. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 620-28.
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control may be costly for existing polluters, this allocation is long
overdue.
A look at the underlying condition of the river points to feasible
solutions long advocated by commentators, 15 7 and now supported by
administrative officials. 158 The time has come to implement liabilitybased programs that provide market incentives to clean up the environment. A system that allocates the cost of pollution to the polluting parties goes far in eliminating many of the disincentives created by the
command and control structure. 15 9 Several alternatives have been suggested in commentary, some already implemented with success.1 60
Economic and technical assessment of methods to control pollution
to meet reduction goals should be placed not on the agency but on the
responsible polluters. Several means of reapportioning this responsibility exist and have been implemented on a limited scale to meet specific
needs.' 6 1 Regulating pollution through market-based controls, either
by transferable permits, or taxation according to emission levels provides cost reduction incentives to polluters. 16 2 A permit system acknowledges the inevitability of externalities at an acceptable,
governmentally approved level. Once an acceptable level of pollution is
established the polluting industries can allocate between themselves,
within a defined economic or geographical area, the cost of pollution
control. The ability to develop least polluting alternatives is rewarded
by a direct offset in the cost of business. Clean-up costs are placed in
the more competent hands of businesses which possess incentives to innovate pollution reduction technologies that increase bottom-line effi157. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
158. Richard B. Stewart, long a proponent of market based incentives, served at the
post of Assistant Attorney General, Department ofJustice, Environment and Natural Resources Division; See supra note 14 and accompanying text. His comments before the Administrative Conference in 1990 on the need for reform and alternatives to the existing
system are summarized in the Yale Journal on Regulation article. See Marshall J. Breger,
et al, Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, Address during the Congressional debate over the Clean Air Act Amendments (April 23, 1990), in 8 YALEJ. ON REG.
463 (1991). The overall goal is to achieve the most clean-up for limited dollars, "[g]iven
that the amount that society is actually willing to spend for environmental protection is
limited, that [use of incentives] means we can get more environmental protection for the
same amount of money by using economic incentives." Id. at 469.
159. 1 am not suggesting a moratorium on new upstream activities. Reforms would
invite the influx of the most economically and environmentally sound industries at the
expense of those no longer able to contribute to the goal of keeping the waters clean. For
an additional discussion of the positive effects of reallocating externality costs to those in
the best position to prevent harm, see Babich, supra note 12, at 755-58.; See also supra notes
14-15.
160. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 14, at 470 (citing success of lead phase-down
in gasoline effected through trading lead reduction credits); TIETENBERG, supra note 15, at
93-122; Hahn & Stavins, supra note 15, at 8 (citing an emissions trading program for saving
between $5-$12 billion over program life; a lead trading program; proposed use of tradeable permits for water pollution control at Lake Dillon, Colorado with potential savings of
over $1 million annually; and voluntary water exchange programs as alternatives to litigation between western states for water allocation).
161. See supra notes 14, 15, 155, 157 and accompanying text.
162. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A
New Era From an Old Idea? 18 ECOLOGY L.O. 1 (1991).
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ciency. Similar incentives exist under a pollution tax system where
improved pollution control is rewarded by a direct tax reduction. These
systems not only free up agency resources, the permit fees or taxes assessed as penalties provide a direct financial benefit to the agency. Liability based programs such as the Comprehensive Environmental
Responsibility Liability Compensation Act (CERCLA) 1 6 3 also impose
the cost of pollution reduction directly on the responsible polluters. Imposition of strict retroactive liability forces polluters to internalize externality costs.164 Leaving industry with no choice but to reduce pollution
provides incentive to develop least-cost methods for pollution control.
This need can be filled internally by the polluting industry, or polluters
can locate third parties with clean-up expertise to complete the work on
a least cost basis. This internal/external competition will promote efficient methods of compliance.
C.

Economic Balancing

The CWA edict against pollution is minimized by the Arkansas v.
Oklahoma decision. Explicit in the EPA's duty to issue permits is a balancing of economic interests. 1 65 A cost-benefit analysis necessarily
means the decision focus shifts from pollution abatement to cost allocation. The most difficult portion of the costs to allocate are the externalities resulting from plant operation. In the Illinois River situation, those
bearing the costs of pollution receive none of the benefits; the downstream Oklahoma parties receive no benefit from the Fayetteville waste
treatment plant. This problem also supports reform of the existing system. Decisions need to be made regarding the best home for unavoida66
ble externalities.'
Questioning this balancing points to the riddle underlying why the
Supreme Court allows the EPA such great latitude in applying policy.
On its deepest level, accountability becomes the overriding question.
Congressional delegation of the decision-making responsibility appears
indicative of its underlying fear that it will be held accountable for unpopular policy implementation. 167 Chevron provided insight into this rationale as the Court speculated that Congress "consciously desired the
163.

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp.I 1989).

164. Babich, supra note 12, at 750. The liability based statutes of the 1980's reflect a
policy choice by Congress that those in some way responsible for the release of toxic
chemical, rather than the public at large must bear the costs of environmental pollution.
Id.
165. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3713. "[C]onsideration must be given, on a caseby-case basis, to a balancing of economic and social costs against social and economic
benefits sought to be obtained." Id.
166. For an example of the enormity of externality costs see GRAD, supra note 18, at
§ 3.01[3] (American Public Works Association estimates it will cost between $15 to $48
billion to remedy overflows from storm and waste combined sewers).
167. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICEs 26 (1978)
("Evasion, disguise, temporizing, deception are all ways by which artfully chosen allocation methods can avoid the appearance of failing to reconcile values in conflict."); Macey,
supra note 150, at 285 (One strategy for maximizing political support under conditions of
uncertainty is to delegate the matter to an administrative agency.)
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Administrator to strike the balance at this [agency] level, thinking that
those with greater expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so.' 168 While
sounding reasonable, this allows legislators to point fingers to programs
clearly in the public interest, and at the same time wash their hands of
responsibility for poor administration.
V.

CONCLUSION

The legitimate attempt by the Tenth Circuit to equitably administer the
CWA by viewing the legislation as a whole has been overruled. Another
vote for the status quo of EPA deference results in the EPA emerging as
the preferred creator, interpreter and enforcer of national policy. Conscious implementation of cost-effective programs, subject to reasonable
judicial checks, 169 would be a positive step in alleviating the pollution
problem. Until that happens, the states, affected businesses and individuals are left swimming upstream against a growing tide of EPA
discretion.
Cynthia L. McNeill

168. Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
169. See Deanell Reece Tacha,Judges on Judging: Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 279 (1991) ("The complexities of the law-making and law-interpreting tasks in the third century of this republic cry out for systematic dialogue between
those who make and those who interpret legislation."); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L.
Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators andJudges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 1045 (199 1)(citing the need for better communication between judges and legislators); Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56
GEO. WASH. REV. 703 (1988) (advocating a structural review of statutes as a means to
better understand legislative intent).

